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Letter
Spatial Voting Meets Spatial Policy Positions:
An Experimental Appraisal
TANJA ARTIGA GONZA´LEZ VU University Amsterdam
GEORG D. GRANIC Erasmus University Rotterdam & University of Antwerp
We develop and validate a novel experimental design that builds a bridge between experimentalresearch on the theory of spatial voting and the literature onmeasuring policy positions from text.Our design utilizes established text-scaling techniques and their corresponding coding schemes to
communicate candidates’ numerical policy positions via verbal policy statements. This design allows
researchers to investigate the relationshipbetween candidates’policy stances and voter choice in a purely text-
based context. We validate our approach with an online survey experiment. Our results generalize previous
ﬁndings in the literatureand show thatproximity considerationsare empiricallyprevalent inpurely text-based
issue framing scenarios. The design we develop is broad and portable, and we discuss how it adds to current
experimental designs, as well as suggest several implications and possible routes for future research.
INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in experimental researchonthe theory of spatial voting have deepened ourunderstanding of how candidates’ policy posi-
tions translate into voting behavior (Claassen 2007,
2009;TomzandvanHouweling2008, 2009).Byvirtueof
combining formal modeling with suitable experimental
designs, these studies contribute important insights to
a lively debate about the shape and form of voters’
judgment on candidates’ policy stances. One of their
main ﬁndings is that proximity considerations—voters
preferring candidates closer to themselves in a policy
space—outweigh non-proximity considerations; the
extent to which this holds true varies with demographic
variables and the policy domain considered.1
Current experimental designs typically represent
candidates as numerical points on line-resembling
scales.2 We argue that these designs limit the general-
izability of their conclusions in two ways. First, wide-
spread evidence documents that preferences can be
inﬂuencedby themodeof thinking inducedby elicitation
methods (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). The question
format’s narrow spatial framingmay thus be leading and
suggestive, thereby creating an artiﬁcial inﬂation of
(certain) spatial considerations. Second, the question
format deviates from the way in which political actors
typically communicate their standpoints on policy issues
via public speeches orwritings.Whether or not, and how
voters take into account spatial considerations thus
depends on their cognitive abilities to transform speech
or text to numerical values on the policy scales.
To overcome these problems, we propose to augment
currentexperimentaldesignswith text-based,objectively
veriﬁable issue positions that acknowledge voters’ cog-
nitive realities. Such adesignprovides a critical stress test
of whether proximity models provide an effective ap-
proximation of voting behavior in purely issue-oriented
elections. The literature on measuring policy positions
offers the appropriate tools for this endeavor (an over-
view is provided in Laver 2014). In particular, text-based
scalingmethods exist that convert the content of political
texts into numerical policy stances (Benoit et al. 2012;
Lowe et al. 2011). Each scaling method is accompanied
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1 Spatial models occupy a prominent role in political science as they
capture two interdependent decision processes at the heart of de-
mocracy: voters’ choices to support candidates representing their
interests andcandidates’ choices to takea stanceon issuesappealing to
voters (Black 1958; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1990). We refer
toGrofman (2004) for a reviewof proximity-based spatialmodels and
to Tomz and van Houweling (2008) for a discussion of the different
theories and their implications for voter choice.
2 This approach is known as the Formal Theory Approach or FTA
(see Morton and Williams 2010, Chapter 6). In an FTA, the experi-
mental design bears as close a resemblance as possible to the formal
theories that are tested. The FTA implements fully ideal conditions
with the aim of evaluating the extent to which the theories under
investigation organize experimental observations. Extrapolating
ﬁndings from fully ideal conditions that constitute abstract sim-
pliﬁcations of the real world, to the intended domain of application,
requires a critical assessmentofwhich formal assumptions are likely to
be violated in the intended domain, and how these violations matter
for the inferences we wish to draw.
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by a coding scheme to classify text units. The classiﬁed
text is then scaled by variousmeans to locate candidates’
numerical policy positions on latent policy dimensions.
These methods can be used to represent candidates’
policy positions in terms of text-statements in experi-
ments by a reverse-engineering process. The researcher
ﬁrst constructs a relevant spatial distribution of candi-
dates in a given policy space and then inverts the text-
scaling methods to yield political texts compatible with
the original spatial distribution. The advantages of such
an approach are evident. For one, it gives rise to ex-ante,
theoretically justiﬁed numerical representations of can-
didates’ policy stances in a spatial-free context. Fur-
thermore, it acknowledges a natural cognitive aspect of
issue voting. Political text is everywhere. From social
media platforms to candidates’ personal websites to
voting advice applications, political actors use policy
statements that are similar to those offered in the coding
schemes of scaling methods to interact with voters.
We designed and carried out an internet experiment on
a generalUSpopulation todemonstrate the validity of our
proposed approach. Our design mimics the status quo of
experimentalresearchonspatialvotingwithoneimportant
exception: candidates are represented by text statements
that follow recommendations laid out in the existing lit-
erature on how to scale policy positions from text (Benoit
et al. 2012; Lowe et al. 2011). We ﬁnd that between 72%
and 76%of voters cast votes in accordancewith proximity
considerations.Moreprecisely, these voters cast votes that
minimize the distance between their own issue stance and
the text-based, theoretically calculated candidate position
on a left-right economic policy dimension.We further ﬁnd
averagevoters’assessmentsof candidates tobe in linewith
theoretically calculated policy positions. The mean abso-
lute deviationbetween the average voters’ assessment and
their theoretical stance is 0.34 measured on an 11-point
scale. In other words, voters seem capable enough to ac-
curately transform unambiguous political texts into nu-
merical stances. We also ﬁnd proximity considerations to
be more prevalent in voters with political experience,
proxied by political platform membership and past par-
ticipation in elections. These results are compatible with
recent categorization-based models of spatial voting that
predict prevalence of proximity preferences as voters gain
political experience (Collins 2011).
In summary, we propose and empirically validate
a fruitful interplaybetweenexperimental researchon the
theory of spatial voting and the literature on measuring
policy positions. Our design serves as a blueprint for
testing the generalizability of established experimental
results concerning the theoryof spatial voting. In thenext
section we present our experimental set-up and review
the text-based scaling methods that are appropriate for
designing a critical stress test of proximity voting. Finally,
we discuss our results and conclude with implications for
current and future research.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We designed an internet survey experiment and
recruited 401participants fromageneralUSpopulation
via the research platform Proliﬁc.3 Detailed descriptive
statistics of the sample can be found in Table A.1 in the
online supplementary materials.4 Our experiment
presented participants with a presidential election
scenario involving three candidates. To minimize the
inﬂuence of non-issue considerations, the candidates
were labeled neutrally and referred to as A, B, and C
throughout the experiment. Each candidate was rep-
resented by ﬁve statements mainly concerning the
economic policy that the candidate would implement, if
elected.5 The statements were based on examples laid
out in the code-book of the Manifesto Project, which
estimates policy positions derived from content analysis
of electoral manifestos (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann
et al. 2006;Volkensetal. 2013).The code-bookprovides
coding instructions to categorize each statement of
a political text as a reference to the political-left, the
political-right, or an unrelated or neutral reference
(Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015).
Our three candidates were designated as follows: L
was left-wing,M was centrist, and R was right-wing. L
made three ‘left’ statements, one ‘neutral’ statement,
and one ‘right’ statement. The centrist candidateMwas
represented by ﬁve neutral statements. R made three
right, oneneutral, andone left statement.Of note, in the
experiment, candidate-labels A, B, and C were ran-
domly assigned to candidates L,M, and R to minimize
any labeling effects.
Our composition of left, neutral, and right statements
created the necessary conditions for a stringent test of
proximity considerations. That is, participants were
required to interpret a variety of text-statements in
order to understand each candidate’s nuanced policy
stance. The statements were chosen to represent
moderate and credible stances—avoiding topics pub-
licly debated at the time of the experiment—related to
the policy dimension of state involvement in the
economy, i.e., expanding versus reducing the active role
of the government in the economy (Benoit and Laver
2007; Lowe et al. 2011). The exact statements and the
corresponding coding categories are presented inTable
A.2 in the supplementary online materials.
Participants were ﬁrst shown the description of the
three candidates and then asked to rate each on a 100-
point thermometer rating scale. The question wording
and display formatwas taken from theNESwith ratings
between 0 and 50° expressing unfavorable feelings
3 Proliﬁc is a well-proven research platform that connects researchers
with respondents, providing a source of high-quality data (Peer et al.
2017). All participants received monetary compensation in accor-
dance with Proliﬁc’s general terms and conditions, which ensure fair
pay.
4 Our sample shows the typical characteristics of a general online
panel and ismore or less representative of theUS adult population. In
particular, mid-range income levels, males, and higher educational
levels are overrepresented whereas the highest household income
level, females, and individuals with lower levels of education are
underrepresented. The complete data-set will be made available on
the authors’ websites.
5 We have chosen economic policy due to its prominent role in public
discourse. See: http://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-
problem.aspx.
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toward a candidate, and ratings between 50 and 100°
expressing favorable feelings. The thermometer ratings
provided us with a ﬁrst indication of voters’ preferences
in a spatial-free context.
We used the thermometer ratings to create critical
voting conditions. Speciﬁcally, following the ther-
mometer rating questions, each voter was asked to
imagine that they were are about to cast a vote in the
election. For reasons not further speciﬁed in the
instructions, only twoof three candidates decided to run
for ofﬁce. The candidate who dropped out of the race
was theone that thevoterevaluatedmost favorablywith
her or his thermometer rating.6 This procedure forced
every participant to make a compromising choice and
ensured that ‘proximity’ voters had to develop a com-
plete spatial representation over the full candidate-set.
In this sense, our critical voting conditions constituted
a stringent test of proximity considerations. Participants
were then presented with the aforementioned voting
scenario, casting their vote in a two-candidate race.
Wenext askedparticipant to place themselves and the
candidates on a left-right economic policy dimension.
Using the question wording and response format from
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010 (Bakker
et al. 2012), we explained that candidates on the eco-
nomic leftwantedgovernment toplayanactiverole in the
economy whereas candidates on the economic right
emphasizeda reducedeconomic role for thegovernment.
Voters thenplaced themselves andeachcandidateon this
11-point scale with 0, 5, and 10 representing the far-left,
the center, and the far-right, respectively.Wedeemed the
CHES 2010 question appropriate due to its empirical
validityand immediateconnection to theeconomicpolicy
statements we used to describe candidates.
The experiment was administered in three different
treatments to stringently test the empirical validity of our
proposedmethodologicalcrossover. In thebaselineversion
(N 5 204 participants), respondents went through the
survey questions in one sitting, in the same order as de-
scribed above. In the delayed version (N 5 89), we sepa-
rated the self-placement of respondents and their decision
tovotebyapproximately sevendaysviaa two-wavedesign.
In wave 1, participants saw the same survey as in baseline
except for the voting scenario. In wave 2, participants saw
the candidate description once more and were then pre-
sented with the voting scenario. This design allowed us to
test the robustness of ourﬁndingswith regard the temporal
ephemerality and the stabilityofproximity considerations.7
Both the baseline and the delayed versions employed
slidermeasures as the response format. Slidermeasures
clearly resemble a one-dimensional policy space, which
may induce spatial considerations on their own. Our
ﬁnal version, the text-input version (N5 100), therefore
replaced the slider measures with conventional text-
input boxes. Otherwise, the text-input version was
identical to the baseline version, i.e., participant went
through the survey questions in one sitting in the same
order as in the baseline version. Screen-shots from the
decision screens for each question type can be found in
the online supplementary materials.
The experiment concluded with a set of socio-
demographic questions. Data was collected in a time-
frame of about three weeks, beginning at the end of
October, 2017, and wrapping up mid-November, 2017.
The baseline version and wave one of the delay version
were launched simultaneously after data collection for
the text-input version had been completed.
MEASURING POLICY DISTANCES
We borrowed from the literature on measuring policy
positions to transform text statements into a numerical
scale and adopted the RILE score formula—and crucial
modiﬁcations to it—to scale the right-left ideological
economic-policy position of our candidates on the basis of
the statements they make.8 We considered three scales
currently applied in the literature (Budge et al. 2001; Kim
and Fording 2002; Lowe et al. 2011): the unconditional or
rawRILE, whichmeasures the relative frequency of right
statements in relation to the relative frequency of left
statements; the conditional RILE, which discards neutral
references from the calculation; and the empirical Logit
Scale of Position, which measures the relative balance
between left and right statements. Let Ls and Rs denote
the absolute number of left and right statements of a po-
litical text within a ﬁxed multi-category policy dimension,
and let S denote the total number of statements. The
different measures thus take the following form:
RILERaw ¼ Rs LsS ;
RILEConditional ¼ Rs LsRsþ Ls ;
Logit Scale ¼ log Rsþ 0:5
Lsþ 0:5
 
:
The theoretically calculated candidate positionswere
then linearly projected onto the left-right economic
policy dimension, thereby obtaining candidate and
voter stances in the same policy space. Table 1 presents
the theoretically calculated candidate scores. Our main
measure of proximity considerations were distance-
minimizing votes, i.e., votes that minimize the dis-
tance between voters’ self-placement, and the theo-
retically calculated candidate scores on the economic
left-right dimension.6 Such withdrawals are quite common in real elections. For example,
after his withdrawal from the campaign, millions of Bernie Sanders
supporters in the 2016US presidential election de facto faced a choice
between the center-left democratic partynomineeHillaryClintonand
her right-wing republican counterpart Donald Trump.
7 In total, 97 participants were assigned to the delay version, of which
eight ﬁnished wave 1, but failed to complete wave 2. We therefore
obtained 89 complete responses for the delay version and 393 com-
plete responses for the experiment.
8 Saliency theory, the theoretical underpinning that gives rise to the
rawRILE score as a scaling method for manifesto coded texts, can be
criticized on various grounds (Dolezal et al. 2014; Lowe et al. 2011).
We have therefore speciﬁcally followed recommendations laid out in
the current literature on how to scale a policy position frommanifesto
coded text that avoids common pitfalls (Benoit et al. 2012; Lowe et al.
2011).
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RESULTS
We begin our analysis by discussing voters’ self-
placement and candidate-placements on the CHES
2010 economic left-right scale, ranging from 0 (left) to 10
(right). Figure 1 presents the corresponding results.
Participants placed themselves at the center-left, with
an average score of 4.53 (median 4). The designated
right-wing candidate R was on average placed at 6.89
(median 7), the center candidateM received an average
placement of 4.33 (median 4), and the designated left-wing
candidate L was on average placed at 3.47 (median 3).
Comparing the average and median candidate-
placements to the theoretical ones obtained through
the Logit and RILE scales reveals a high degree of
congruency between voters’ perceptions of the candi-
dates and the theoretically calculated stances in the
policy space.
Using the Logit Scale as our benchmark—which
has the lowest mean squared error among the three
scales we consider—placement of voters differed
by 0.12 points (5 |6.892 6.77|) forR andby 0.24 (5 |3.47
2 3.23|) for L. The largest difference of 0.67 (5 |4.332
5.00|) can be observed forM. Although speculative, one
possible explanation is that, in times of polarized
debates surrounding the presidency of Donald Trump,
centrist positions might have been perceived as anti-
incumbent and, therefore, more leftist than they
actually were.
These results provide strong evidence that voters
are endowed with the cognitive ability to convert un-
ambiguous political text into reasonable numeric policy
stances.
We next analyze whether voters are able to use this
information to vote for the candidate closest to their
own position. We calculate the distance between each
participant and each candidate as being the absolute
distancebetweenherorhis self-reportedplacement and
the theoretical placement based on theLogit andRILE
scales. Table 2 presents the absolute and relative fre-
quencies of participants who voted for the candidate
with minimum distance.
To account for the possibility of errors, we compare
these values to the expected relative frequencies
obtained under uniform random behavior, i.e., random
voting and self-placement behavior. Across all three
treatments and all three scales, at least 70% of par-
ticipants (Logit Scale, Baseline) cast distance mini-
mizing votes ranging up to almost 79% (Raw RILE,
Delay). Using an exact binomial test, we reject the null
hypothesis of uniform random behavior for each
treatment and each scale at the 1% level (applying
the Holm–Bonferroni correction to account for
family-wise error rates). These results validate the
empirical relevance of proximity considerations in
a purely text-based framing of issue positions, and
generalize previous ﬁndings in the existing literature.
TABLE 1. Theoretical Candidate Scores and Their Projections on the 11-Point Economic Policy
Dimension.
Logit scale Conditional RILE Raw RILE
Candidate Original Projection Original Projection Original Projection
L 20.37 3.23 20.50 2.50 20.40 3.00
M 0.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 5.00
R 0.37 6.77 0.50 7.50 0.40 7.00
FIGURE 1. Box-Plots for Candidates and Self-Placements on the CHES 2010 11-Point Left–Right
Economic Policy Scale.
Notches represent non-parametric estimates of 95% conﬁdence intervals for the medians. ‘X’ marks the corresponding means with 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
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Instructively, but also coincidentally, our estimate of
proximity considerations is in line with the combined
proximity and discounted proximity estimates—between
which our design cannot discriminate—of Tomz and van
Houweling (2008). We also calculated the post-hoc ach-
ieved power for each statistical test reported in Table 1.
Setting alpha at the conventional level of 5%, the smallest
achieved post-hoc power over all tests was 98%.We also
computed the a-priori required minimum sample size to
detect the signiﬁcance of our observed effect-sizes. We
thereby set alpha and beta to the conventional levels of
5% and 20% (5 80% power), respectively. For all tests,
actual sample sizes exceeded the required minimum
sample sizes by a factor of at least 2.4 (i.e., actual sample
size . 2.4 * required sample size).
We conclude our analysis with an investigation of an-
tecedent factors of proximity considerations. So far, we
have used cognitive ability as a catch-all phrase but have
not discussed the potential mechanism relating cognitive
ability to spatial preferences.One possibility is formalized
in the theory of categorization-based spatial voting
(Collins 2011). This theory posits that voters categorize
candidates and have preferences over categories. As
political experience grows, voters build ﬁner and more
distinct categories; theﬁner the categories, the closer their
preferences resemble proximity considerations.
This theory draws on well-established ﬁndings that
show that cognitive abilities relating to categorization
arenotﬁxedandcanbe improved throughpractice, and,
hence, experience.Weconsider twoproxies for political
experience: political platform membership and partic-
ipation in previous elections. We calculate the average
marginal effect of platform membership and previous
participation on the probability of casting distance
minimizing votes, based on probit estimations. In ac-
cordance with categorization-based spatial voting,
platform membership and previous participation are
associated with an 11.3 and 11.7 percentage point in-
crease in the probability of casting distance minimizing
votes (p-values are 0.015 and 0.064). However, this
interpretation warrants caution: The observed associ-
ations cannot be interpreted as causal effects because
voters with more consistent proximity preferences
could also simply self-select into higher rates of politi-
cal participation.9 Nevertheless, we posit that our
results are compatible with the view that political
experience affects how voters judge the policy stances
of candidates.
CONCLUSION
We build a bridge between experimental research on
spatial voting and the literature on measuring policy
positions to increase our conﬁdence in the conclusions
drawn from the former. We demonstrate the feasibility
and fruitfulness of this approach via an internet survey
experiment. Our experimental results generalize pre-
vious ﬁndings, showing that proximity considerations
are empirically prevalent within a purely text-based
framing of issue positions in the policy domain we
study.We further identify political experience as a vital
mechanism underlying proximity considerations.
Beyond our speciﬁc observations, we extend a call for
future research to test the generalizability of experi-
mental results. The route should be one of systemati-
cally relaxing theoretical assumptions to create a more
realistic and ecologically valid testing design. Our ex-
perimental design is portable and adaptive, and serves
as a blueprint for experimental research on spatial
voting. By applying this design, candidates’ issue
positions can easily be constructed on the spot and
tailored to the needs of speciﬁc research questions. For
example, as in Tomz and van Houweling (2008), they
can be constructed on the basis of voter input to tease
out different forms of spatial considerations.
Extensions to multi-dimensional issue spaces or text
ambiguity and uncertainty pose no difﬁculty as ap-
propriate techniques are readily available in the vast
TABLE 2. Absolute (N) and Relative Frequency (N%) of Participants Who Cast Distance-Minimizing
Votes.
Treatment #Voters
Logit scale Conditional RILE RILE
(Expected N% 50.0) (Expected N% 51.5) (Expected N% 54.5)
N N% N N% N N%
Baseline 204 143 70.1*** 146 71.6*** 151 74.0***
Delay 89 65 73.0*** 70 78.7*** 70 78.7***
Text-input 100 74 74.0*** 75 75.0*** 77 77.0***
Pooled 393 282 71.8*** 291 74.0*** 298 75.8***
Distance was calculated between voters’ self-reported stances on the CHES left-right scale and the theoretically calculated Logit and Rile
measures for the candidates. The ‘Expected’ relative frequency was calculated under the assumption of uniform-random behavior.
*** Signify signiﬁcance of exact binomial tests on equality of observed and expected relative frequencies at the 1%-level (all p-values were
adjusted according to Holm–Bonferroni).
9 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that
our experiment does not allow us to unequivocally identify the di-
rection of causality. We believe that disentangling the two explan-
ations could be an interesting endeavor. One possible avenue for
future research, therefore, couldbe torandomlyassigncategorization-
learning tasks to politically inexperienced individuals.
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literature on measuring policy positions (Benoit,
Mikhaylov, andLaver2009;Loweet al. 2011; Slapinand
Proksch 2008). It is even conceivable to extend the idea
of measuring voters’ positions in a spatial-free context
by allowing them to describe their policy stance in terms
of pre-deﬁned statements. We hope that the ﬂexibility
and enormous potential of our proposed methodolog-
ical cross-over are self-evident and that it will inspire
future research, across a variety of contexts, to close our
knowledge-gap on how voters judge candidates and
how they act upon these judgments.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please
visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000492.
Replication materials can be found on Dataverse at:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/Z7P7RL.
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